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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jessie Trevino Salinas, pled guilty to one count of
possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. Mr. Salinas reluctantly plead guilty but
upon further reflection, he desired additional time to assess his case and believed a motion to
suppress may be a viable option because his traffic stop was prolonged in order to allow a drug
dog to arrive, and because the Idaho Supreme Court had just issued its decision in State v. Fuller,
163 Idaho 585 (2018) (holding crossing the fog line does not constitute a violation of I.C. § 49637(1)), and where Mr. Salinas was stopped, in part, for driving onto the fog line. The district
court denied Mr. Salinas’ pre-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea and sentenced him
to ten years, with four years fixed.
On appeal, Mr. Salinas contends the district court erred in denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea because he presented a “just reason” to withdraw his plea, as he wished
to assert what he believed were viable defenses to the charges.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On August 30, 2017, Jessie Trevino Salinas was pulled over after law enforcement
observed him turning without signaling and driving on the white fog line.
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 p.3.)

(Presentence

After law enforcement made contact with

Mr. Salinas and learned that he did not have proof of insurance, he was handcuffed and a drug
dog was run around his car. (PSI, p.3.) The dog alerted, and a search of the vehicle yielded a
syringe with residue. (PSI, p.4.) Several months later, on October 24, 2017, Officer Murphy

1

The designation “PSI” includes the presentence investigation report as well as any attachments
such as letters of support for Mr. Salinas.
1

received the laboratory test result for the residue; it was positive for methamphetamine. (PSI,
p.4.) One month later, on November 30, 2017, he made contact with Mr. Salinas to arrest him
for possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. (PSI, p.4.) Upon stopping the
vehicle Mr. Salinas was a passenger in, Officer Murphy located two plastic bags containing a
substance testing presumptively positive for methamphetamine and items of paraphernalia,
including baggies. (PSI, p.4.)
Based on these facts, the State filed an information charging Mr. Salinas with possession
of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, and
possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.33-36.) Mr. Salinas was also charged by Information
with a sentencing enhancement for having a prior drug conviction. (R., pp.37-39.)
On February 26, 2018, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Salinas pled guilty to
possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. (2/26/18 Tr., p.9, Ls.1-2; R., pp.4556.) In exchange for Mr. Salinas’ guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts
and to recommend a unified sentence of eight years, with three years fixed. (2/26/18 Tr., p.5,
Ls.10-25; R., p.45.) The district court accepted the plea, ordered a PSI, and set the matter for
sentencing. (2/26/18 Tr., p.9, Ls.3-15; R., p.42.)
On April 23, 2018, Mr. Salinas failed to appear for his sentencing hearing. (R., p.68.)
He was arrested and attended a status conference on April 30, 2018. (R., p.80.) On May 31,
2018, Mr. Salinas filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, because he had become aware of
multiple bases for a motion to suppress. (R., pp.81-82.) Mr. Salinas sought to withdraw his plea
of guilty prior to sentencing because after he pled guilty, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its
decision in State v. Fuller, a case holding that driving on the fog line does not provide reasonable
articulable suspicion for a traffic stop for failure to maintain a lane of travel. (R., p.81; 6/11/18
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Tr., p.14, Ls.1-5.) Mr. Salinas also asserted that he wished to withdraw his plea because the
officer delayed the stop to get a drug dog on scene. (R., pp.81-82; 6/11/18 Tr., p.20, Ls.10-15.)
Mr. Salinas moved the court to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea because, at the time he
plead guilty, he was very reluctant to waive his defenses, and with further consideration of case
law, including the new Supreme Court decision in Fuller, he desired to withdraw his plea to
assert those defenses. (R., pp.81-82.)
On June 11, 2018, the district court held a hearing on Mr. Salinas’ motion to withdraw
his guilty plea. (6/11/18 Tr.) At the hearing, the court advised the parties that it had just gotten a
PSI, and neither Mr. Salinas nor his counsel had reviewed the PSI. (6/11/18 Tr., p.11, Ls.11-15.)
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court denied the motion, finding Mr. Salinas failed
to present and support a just reason “and granting the motion is not appropriate.” (R., p.92.) The
district court issued a written memorandum decision explaining why it denied Mr. Salinas’
motion. (R., pp.87-93.) In it, the district court examined Mr. Salinas’ reasons for pleading
guilty, considered that in failing to appear for the sentencing hearing he may have vitiated the
plea agreement, and ultimately concluded, “[t]he stated reasons for withdrawal do not give rise to
serious questions about the plea.” (R., p.92.) The court concluded that Mr. Salinas “has received
other information regarding the probable sentence and this Court may temper its liberality in the
exercise of discretion.” (R., p.92.) The court was referring to the fact that Mr. Salinas failed to
appear for his sentencing hearing, which the court presumed would result in the State being
released from the agreement, “[t]hus the State may ask for up to life imprisonment, not the eight
year sentence with three years determinate in the plea agreement.” (R., p.92.)

3

The district court then reviewed the PSI and sentenced Mr. Salinas to a sentence of ten
years unified, with four years fixed. (7/23/18 Tr., p.35, Ls.17-20; R., pp.95-98.) Mr. Salinas
filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.100-102.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Salinas’ motion to withdraw his guilty
plea?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Salinas’ Motion To Withdraw His
Guilty Plea Where Mr. Salinas Established “Just Reason” To Withdraw The Plea

A.

Introduction
Mr. Salinas filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing because, at the

time he plead guilty, he was very reluctant to waive his defenses, and with further consideration
of case law, including the new Supreme Court decision in Fuller, he desired to withdraw his plea
to assert those defenses.

(R., pp.81-82.)

The district court denied Mr. Salinas’ motion.

However, Mr. Salinas presented a just reason to withdraw his plea—his belief that he had viable
defenses to his charges, including a viable motion to suppress. Mr. Salinas asserts that the
district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea, because the court
failed to act consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it
and failed to reach its decision by an exercise of reason.

B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate courts review cases in which a defendant moves to withdraw his guilty plea

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Sunseri, No. 45260, 2018 WL 5628898, at *2 (Idaho Oct. 31,
2018). In applying the abuse of discretion standard, the reviewing court examines whether the
trial court:
(1) Correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, __, 421 P.3d 187, 198 (2018).

6

C.

The General Law Governing Motions To Withdraw Guilty Pleas Prior To
Sentencing/Viewing The PSI
Motions to withdraw guilty pleas are governed by I.C.R. 33(c). After a defendant has

been sentenced, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea generally will be granted only to correct
manifest injustice. Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c); State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887 (Ct. App.
2002); State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 361 (Ct. App. 1997). “This strict standard is justified
to insure that an accused is not encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential
punishment and withdraw the plea if the sentence were unexpectedly severe.” State v. Hartsock,
160 Idaho 639, 641 (Ct. App. 2016).
However, for those defendants who wish to withdraw their guilty plea prior to
sentencing, provided they have not yet viewed the PSI, a lower standard applies. “The rule
distinguishes between pleas made prior to and after sentencing, exacting a less rigorous measure
of proof for presentence motions.” State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 485 (1993). Defendants
wishing to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing “must show a just reason for withdrawing
the plea. If he does so, then the State may avoid the granting of the motion by showing that
prejudice would result if the plea were withdrawn.” Sunseri, 2018 WL 5628898 at *3 (quoting
State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 485 (1993).). “When the motion is presented before sentencing, if
it occurs after the defendant has learned of the content of the PSI or has received other
information about the probable sentence, the district court may temper its liberality by weighing
the defendant’s apparent motive.” State v. Hartsock, 160 Idaho 639, 641 (Ct. App. 2016)
(holding the district court was entitled to take the defendant’s awareness of the PSI and sentence
recommendation into account when ascertaining her motive for withdrawing her plea).
The Idaho Supreme Court recently issued a decision addressing the withdrawal of a
guilty plea prior to sentencing in State v. Sunseri. 2018 WL 5628898. The Sunseri Court laid
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out the appropriate analytical framework for those cases in which the defendant seeks to
withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing:
[W]ithdrawal of a guilty plea before sentence is imposed is not an automatic right.
A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing must show a just
reason for withdrawing the plea.
The just reason standard does not require that the defendant establish a
constitutional defect in his or her guilty plea. Once the defendant has met this
burden, the state may avoid a withdrawal of the plea by demonstrating the
existence of prejudice to the state. The defendant’s failure to present and support
a plausible reason will dictate against granting withdrawal, even absent prejudice
to the prosecution.
Sunseri, at *4 (quoting State v. Hartsock, 160 Idaho 639, 641 (Ct. App. 2016)) (citations
omitted).
To determine whether a defendant has shown a just reason to withdraw his plea, the court
must consider, amongst other factors:
(1) Whether the defendant has credibly asserted his legal innocence; (2) the length
of delay between the entry of the guilty plea and the filing of the motion; (3)
whether the defendant had the assistance of competent counsel at the time of the
guilty plea; and (4) whether withdrawal of the plea will inconvenience the court
and waste judicial resources.
Sunseri, at *4. Further, “the good faith, credibility, and weight of the defendant’s assertions in
support of his motion to withdraw his plea are matters for the trial court to decide.” State v.
Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 537 (Ct. App. 2008). However, “[t]he trial court is encouraged to
liberally exercise its discretion in granting a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.” Sunseri, at *4.
In this case, Mr. Salinas filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, because he had
become aware of multiple bases for a motion to suppress. (R., pp.81-82.) Mr. Salinas sought to
withdraw his plea of guilty prior to sentencing because after he pled guilty, the Idaho Supreme
Court issued its decision in State v. Fuller, a case holding that driving on the fog line does not
provide reasonable articulable suspicion for a traffic stop for failure to maintain a lane of travel.
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(R., p.81; 6/11/18 Tr., p.14, Ls.1-5.) Mr. Salinas also asserted that he wished to withdraw his
plea because the officer delayed the duration of the stop to get a drug dog on scene. (R., pp.8182; 6/11/18 Tr., p.20, Ls.10-15.) Mr. Salinas moved the court to allow him to withdraw his
guilty plea because, at the time he plead guilty, he was very reluctant to waive his defenses, and
with further consideration of case law, including the new Supreme Court decision in Fuller, he
desired to withdraw the plea to assert those defenses. (R., pp.81-82; 6/11/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.1-25.)
In denying the motion, the district court first analyzed whether Mr. Salinas’ plea was
constitutionally valid. (R., p.89.) After finding the plea was entered knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily, it next examined whether there was a “just reason” to allow him to withdraw his
plea. (R., pp.89-90.) In determining whether a “just reason” existed to allow the withdrawal, the
court looked at whether Mr. Salinas was asserting his innocence, and why that claim of
innocence was not maintained earlier. (R., pp.90-91.) The court, relying on State v. Akin, 139
Idaho 160, 163 (Ct. App. 2003), noted that Mr. Salinas did not assert factual innocence, and that
“the desire to exercise rights that have been waived is insufficient reason to allow the withdrawal
of a guilty plea.” (R., p.91.) The court reviewed the probable cause affidavit of the officer
conducting the stop to determine that part of the reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop was that
Mr. Salinas had driven with both tires over the fog line for over 100 feet. (R., p.91.) The court
noted that the officer also asserted that Mr. Salinas failed to use his turn signal which provided
an independent basis for the stop; thus, Fuller did not create a just reason for withdrawing the
plea. (R., p.91.) However, there had been no suppression hearing, and no evidence presented—
the court was merely speculating after reading the probable cause affidavit as to what facts
would be introduced at such a hearing. Further, the district court entirely failed to address the
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other basis for the suppression motion—that the officers delayed the duration of the traffic stop
to allow additional time for the drug dog to arrive. (6/11/18 Tr., p.20, Ls.10-15.)
Mr. Salinas promptly moved to withdraw his plea—he pled guilty on February 26, 2018,
and his motion was filed on May 31, 2018, shortly after the decision in Fuller was published.
(R., pp.43-44, 81-83.) The State did not assert it was prejudiced; instead, it argued that perhaps
Mr. Salinas was motivated to withdraw his plea based on the failure to appear and a positive drug
test, and that Mr. Salinas had not presented a just reason to be permitted to withdraw his plea.
(6/11/18 Tr., p.17, L.11 – p.19, L.25.)
The district court believed that Mr. Salinas may have violated a term and condition of the
plea agreement; therefore, the State might assert that it was not bound to follow the plea
agreement and might ask for an increased sentence. However, none of these speculative facts
had come to fruition at the time Mr. Salinas moved to withdraw his plea. Mr. Salinas had not
“received other information about the probable sentence” (See Hartsock, 160 Idaho at 641), and
although he likely suspected that the State would not be bound by the plea agreement, he had
received no additional information that the State would be asking for a different, or even a
significantly higher, sentence. Although the district court’s focus was primarily on the fact that
he had not shown up for a hearing, which might have removed the State’s obligation to make a
specific sentencing recommendation, there was no additional information from the State that it
would not be recommending the agreed-upon sentence. (See 6/11/18 Tr.)
Further, the language of the plea agreement at issue stated, “The Defendant understands
that the State is released from this agreement if he/she commits any new and additional criminal
acts prior to sentencing, or if he/she fails to attend all scheduled court hearings without just
cause.” (R., pp.46-47, 92.) Yet there had been no hearing on whether the State was still bound

10

by the plea agreement, and no opportunity for Mr. Salinas to assert whether he had “just cause”
for failing to appear at his scheduled sentencing hearing. Thus, the district court’s denial based
on speculations was an abuse of discretion.
In this case, the district court placed too onerous a burden on Mr. Salinas when he sought
to withdraw his plea at this stage in the proceedings. Mr. Salinas was not required to show his
plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary—the just reason standard does not require that
the defendant establish a constitutional defect in his or her guilty plea. See Sunseri at *4. Had
Mr. Salinas established multiple bases for suppression, which, if successful, would have resulted
in his legal innocence; there was a reasonably short length of delay between the entry of the
guilty plea and the filing of the motion; and withdrawal of the plea would not have
inconvenienced the court or wasted judicial resources. See Id. Further, while “the good faith,
credibility, and weight of the defendant’s assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his plea
are matters for the trial court to decide,” “[t]he trial court is encouraged to liberally exercise its
discretion in granting a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.” Id. Where Mr. Salinas had not yet
seen the PSI, and where he asserted that, at the time he plead guilty he was very reluctant to
waive his defenses, and with further consideration of case law, he desired to withdraw the plea to
assert those defenses, the district court should have allowed him to withdraw his plea.
In denying Mr. Salinas’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court abused its
discretion by failing to act consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it, and by failing to reach its decision by the exercise of reason. See Lunneborg, 163
Idaho 856, __, 421 P.3d at 198.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Salinas respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order denying
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 7th day of January, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

SJC/eas

12

